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1 Introduction 
 
Economic instruments (EI), such as subsidies, taxes and insurance-related options are at the 
heart of discussions regarding novel approaches for managing risk and adapting to climate 
change, including in the context of multi-stakeholder partnerships  (MSP) between the 
private and public sectors (Agrarwala and Fankhauser, 2008; Bräuninger et al., 2011; 
Chambwera et al., 2014).  
 
Although the attractiveness of reducing and managing disasters has long been demonstrated 
(e.g., Foresight, 2012), there is underinvestment into disaster risk management (DRM). A 
number of factors, such as lack of comprehensive information and cognitive biases are 
important. In particular, financial constraints and moral hazard, i.e. adverse incentives 
provided by current arrangements for dealing with disasters rule high (Chambwera et al, 
2014). In this line of thinking, instruments that provide a price signal for risk management 
and incentivize behavioural change hold high appeal to policymakers including the EU  (see 
Bräuninger et al,  2011). Yet, little is known about such economic instruments, their 
mechanics, links to risk management and concrete application in the field of disaster risk 
management (and climate adaptation) (see Chambwera et al, 2014.  Knowledge gaps exist 
particularly for conditions that create enabling environments for innovative market based EI. 
Among these are, e.g., the attractiveness for stakeholders in the context of MSP or 
institutional settings that are required to successfully and efficiently apply the EI. 
 
This report reviews key EI according to their potential for managing and incentivising risk 
management in the context of the ENHANCE project. The guiding questions for this review 
are: 
 
• What economic instruments exist for managing disaster risk? 
• How do they contribute to risk management?  
• What innovative options re being discussed? 
• How do case studies plan to discuss and assess economic instruments? 
 
The overall aim of this report is to develop an inventory of EI as they support risk 
management generally and their anticipated uptake in the ENHANCE cases studies.  
 
This report first discusses the methodology and the mechanics of EI. Next it presents the 
market-based and risk financing instruments; finally it concludes with a synthesis of our 
findings and next steps for the case studies, which are being carried out as part of the 
ENHANCE project. 
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2 Methodology 
 
Figure 1 shows the main tasks underway in WP 5 of ENHANCE. This report refers  to Task 
5.1, where we assess the key methodological steps of the mechanics of EI in DRM, based on 
the available literature and a screening of anticipated uptake of the instruments in key 
ENHANCE case studies. The case study screening task is mainly conducted through a 
literature review and questionnaires submitted to our case study partners. The instruments 
with best suitability regarding risk management will be used for a short list of instruments 
that are further assessed ex-ante through, e.g., multi-criteria analysis and modelling. 
Instruments that are considered to be unsuitable for enhancing risk management will be 
excluded. This review lays the foundations for future work in the workpackage, where we 
will examine the instruments closely in terms of a number of criteria, such as ability to 
manage risk (initially discussed here), economic efficiency, equity and acceptability among 
others, as shown in the chart below. 
 
Figure 1: Workflow from Work-package 5 
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In order to identify case studies’ focus and interest in this regard, a questionnaire exploring 
applied economic instruments in the case studies was devised and responses collected, 
which guaranteed coverage of all practically applied instruments in the long list. During the 
review phase, those partners responsible for certain instruments will get in further touch 
with the cases to provide input and enable exchange of information in both directions (case 
studies  with WP5). These research tandems will also cooperate during the follow-up tasks 
5.2 to 5.4. 
 
The following steps have been applied for this report 
 
• We first identify a long list of EI from the literature (what options can be found and what 
is the experience according the literature?) 
• We examine which instruments are being used in the cases (based on a questionnaire 
submitted to case study partners). This guarantees that all applied instruments are 
reflected in our assessment. 
• We analyse how the EI contribute to risk management (directly, indirectly or through 
systemic risk management) and describe the attractiveness for typical MSP stakeholders 
such as public and private actors or households. 
 
 
2.1 Overview of instruments  
 
Our overview focuses on the literature as well as the ENHANCE case studies’ context. 
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3 Mechanics of economic instruments in risk management 
 
Private and public sector agents are tasked with managing disaster risks. While massive 
efforts have been carried out throughout many regions for reducing and managing risk, 
there is good evidence suggesting that that all regions, sectors and societies are less than 
optimally adapted to current hazards and future changes therein, e.g. through climate 
change (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; IPCC, 2014). In fact, as discussed in IPCC (2014) 
given a diverse set of risks and manifold preferences, constraints and perceptions of risk, 
there is no such thing as ‘optimal’ adaptation. Yet, there is ample scope for ‘better’ 
adaptation and risk management. Risk management may happen autonomously or through 
policy intervention and policy instruments-the focus of our attention for this report. 
Apart from insurance-related instruments, few adaptation instruments work directly via 
economic principles and using markets to adapt to impacts and risks. On the other hand, 
economic instruments can be used to indirectly incentivise behaviour and increase the 
uptake and efficiency of adaptation measures. As one important reference, Agrawala and 
Fankhauser (2010) distinguish the following incentive-providing instruments relevant for key 
sectors: 
• Insurance schemes (all sectors subject to extreme weather events),  
• Price signals / markets (water; ecosystems),  
• Financing schemes via PPPs or private finance (flood defence, coastal protection, 
water),  
• Regulatory measures and incentives (building standards; zone planning),  
• Research and development incentives (agriculture, health).   
 
Synthesising this, and in line with recent literature, we consider two broad types of 
instrument categories (see also Chambwera et al., 2014; Bräuninger et al., 2011): 
 
1. Market Based Instruments (MBI) are instruments administered by government 
regulators that provide a monetary/economic incentive promoting risk management 
and adaptation.   According to the EU white paper, the definition of MBI is broad (see 
EU Commission 2009) and in the interpretation of this report it includes natural 
resource pricing, taxes, subsidies, marketable permits, payments for ecosystem 
services, licences, property rights and habitat banking.  
2. Risk Financing Instruments (RFI) comprise  all instruments that promote the sharing 
and transfer of risks and losses. They generally can be classified as pre-disaster 
arrangements, and comprise insurance, weather derivatives and catastrophe bonds.  
In addition to MBI and RFI, financial instruments and public-private partnerships have been 
considered as economic policy instruments as well, yet will not be  examined further by us. 
Financial instruments comprise of all sorts of support mechanisms that allow actors an 
enhanced access to capital. Among these are primarily loans, sometimes blended with 
grants, guarantees and equity investments. The EU has numerous financial instruments at its 
disposal ranging from loans, sometimes combined with grants, through guarantees to equity 
investments. In general, the focus of the policy measures is to just provide a line of funding 
to a certain investment, so there is now specific effect for managing risk. Yet, as many 
measures have a grant element, the instrument can be considered under the category of 
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subsidies. Public Private Partnerships generally refer to contracts  including the allocation of 
liability between public and private entities for implementing infrastructure (see Akintoye, 
Beck and Hardcastle, 2003). In this sense, they are not of relevance for the economic 
instruments, but hold appeal for the discussion of regulation in WP 6.1,2 
 
Three channels through which EI can contribute to risk management can generally be 
identified (see Bräuninger et al., 2011; Chambwera et al., 2014). 
 
1. Direct risk reduction: as one example, risk financing provides direct compensation 
payments which reduce follow-on impacts from an event. 
2. Indirect risk reduction: incentives for risk management and increased resilience help 
to reduce and manage risks. 
3. Managing systemic risk: both down-and upside risk are managed, i.e. insurance takes 
down-side (“bad risks”) risk out of investment decisions, which overall focus on 
harnessing upside risks (“good risks”). 
 
Our inventory is presented in the form of a long list (see table 1) and reflects instruments 
applied in the case studies. The EI are split up into the key groups mentioned above (see 
also  Bräuninger et al., 2011). 
 
3.1 Screening EI in the Enhance case studies context 
 
The following table summarizes the interaction on EI with the case studies. 
  
                                        
1  In a wider sense, Public Private Partnerships have been used synonymously to denote the process 
of arriving at multi-sector partnerships, rather than implementing specific policy instruments, the 
focus of the ENHANCE project overall.  
2 Finally, while a discussion of regulation is key for economic instruments, regulatory policy 
instruments and implications are not covered within the context of this report as they are addressed 
by research in parallel work package 6, and further work in workpackage 5 will integrate findings from 
workpackage 6. 
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Table 1: Overview of economic instruments 
Economic instrument Description Case study application 
 
I. Market based 
instruments 
1. Subsidies 
 
 
Subsidies can be defined as a financial 
support/incentive from a government to 
an entity for implementing a practice or 
performing a specified action. 
 
 
• Rotterdam (tax reductions for steering 
companies) 
• Chamusca (Grants for remove burned 
cork from trees) 
• EU heat wave (Grants can incentivize 
retrofitting of buildings) 
• EU SDF (subsidies or tax reductions 
for certain insurances) 
• Jucar (water fees reductions to water 
users during sustained drought period) 
• Jucar water system (subsidised 
investments in water infrastructure; 
subsidised electricity rates for 
pumping; etc,) 
• Rotterdam (subsidized Joint 
Technology Initiative to limit water 
related risks) 
• Chamusca (subsidized Joint 
Technology Initiative  for fire 
fighting)   
• Grants 
 
Direct payments or grants constitute the 
purest form of a subsidy. An economic 
entity receives an amount of money which 
is supposed to induce the recipient to 
undertake a specific action bound to that 
payment.  
• Price supports Price supports belong to the group of 
indirect subsidies although some direct 
payment is usually associated with them. 
In its most common form, the government 
defines a price floor for a good and pays 
the differential amount to the producers of 
the good as soon as the market price falls 
or is below this minimum level.  
2. Taxes and fees Besides generating government revenue 
allowing public expenditures e.g. for a 
public adaptation policy, taxes can also be 
used to direct private behaviour towards a 
socially optimal behaviour.  
• Po (mandatory land use charge) 
• Rotterdam (Government could provide 
higher safety against fees) 
• Chamusca (Fuel tax for funding 
permanent forestry fundsfire 
protection activities) 
• Jucar water system [in this case, we 
have to consider water tariffs, 
environmental taxes and 
environmental charges (e.g. point-
pollution charges for WWT discharges) 
(The two latter pricing policies are 
more related to water quality than 
quantity, which is the main focus of 
the CS] 
• German Wadden Sea: land owners 
protected by a dyke are bound to pay 
a tax (e.g. in Cuxhaven )     
• Land use taxes 
and fees 
Land use taxes –we understand them as a 
tax on land and buildings – represent a 
payment either for the land ownership 
itself or for its kind of use. Land use fees 
are similar in nature, but they would by 
definition require some type of service 
from the collecting (public) institution in 
return. 
3. Licences, permits 
and variations 
Environmental markets are based on the 
generation of demand for tradable units 
through regulatory decision. This demand 
then triggers the supply of units.  
 
• Project based 
offsets 
A project-based adaptation offset could be 
generated by projects in regions where 
adaptation is relatively easy to generate, 
but where no governmental adaptation 
commitment exists.  
• Market 
mechanisms  
The objective of an Adaptation Market 
Mechanism is to create a market that 
honours adaptation activities of private 
and public actors by setting financial 
incentives 
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Economic instrument Description Case study application 
 
• Advance market 
commitment 
The government guarantees a certain 
income to the entity providing a desired 
activity, making this instrument 
comparable to a subsidy. 
• Chamusca (premium for selling 
burned wood) 
 
 
 
 
4. Other Market 
Based Instruments 
 
These instruments specifically address the 
problem of overuse of natural resources, 
partially picking up some of the broader 
concepts, like taxation. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Chamusca (Payment for Ecosystem by 
WWF/Coca Cola) 
 
 
 
• Po (water banking agriculture to 
urban) 
• Jusca (Water markets) 
• Jucar  (temporary public acquisition of 
water rights in order to guarantee 
environmental flows and supply to 
downstream demands during drought 
periods) 
• Payments for 
ecosystem 
services 
As long as the benefits from changing the 
ecosystem instead of conserving it are 
larger, a payment would be needed in 
order to avoid e.g. conversion of forests to 
pasture. 
• Water markets An intensification of unevenly distributed 
water resources, together with increasing 
average temperatures, calls for the 
efficient use of scarce water supplies. 
Therefore, the efficient (and appropriate) 
pricing and trading of water (rights) is one 
of the key tasks for climate change 
adaptation. 
• Habitat banking Habitat banking aims at conserving the 
ecosystem services of land, including 
biodiversity. Credits are given for the 
creation, restoration and enhancement of 
habitats, while debits occur when 
ecosystems are unavoidably degraded or 
destroyed. 
 
II. Risk financing 
instruments 
 
There are many instruments for dealing 
with the financial burden imposed by 
disasters. At the most general level, we 
distinguish risk financing from loss 
financing instruments. The important 
distinction is that risk financing is 
purchased/organized by persons or a 
community at risk purposefully and in 
anticipation of risk, whereas loss financing 
is arranged by people, governments and 
the state, often ad hoc, after an event.  
 
 
• Insurance Insurance helps to finance losses caused 
by events induced by climate variability. 
Insurance is useful for adaptation in 
incentivizing and enabling and risk 
reduction as well as enabling recovery and 
economic development. 
UK, Chamusca, EU/Eastern 
Europe/Romania/ 
Netherlands/Italy/Spain 
• Po (mandatory insurance, subsidized) 
• Rotterdam (might apply insurances) 
• Vulcano (EU catastrophic insurance for 
recovery) 
• Chamusca (wildfire forest insurance 
for associates; ESF used) 
• EU heat waves (Weather derivatives 
might quickly provide funds) 
• EU SDF (insurance, catastrophe bonds 
or weather derivatives could be used) 
• Spain/Italy drought insurance for 
agriculture 
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Economic instrument Description Case study application 
 
• Catastrophe 
bonds 
A catastrophe bond is an instrument 
whereby disaster risks are packaged 
(securitized) in the financial markets. The 
investor receives an above-market return 
provided a specified catastrophe does not 
occur during the contract, but sacrifices 
interest or part of the principal if the event 
does occur. 
EU/Eastern Europe/Romania  
• Weather 
derivatives 
Weather derivatives are contracts where 
pay-outs are linked to physical ‘triggers’, 
e.g. number of days with temperatures 
below or above a specified threshold, or 
rainfall above or below a specified level.  
Chamusca , EU/Eastern Europe/Romania  
 
In addition, we see a number of interesting additional and innovative mechanisms that are 
worth exploring in the ENHANCE case studies. These include reconsidering the EU solidarity 
fund and studying partnership funding arrangements in the UK. These innovative 
instruments will be further examined and discussed in tasks 5.2-5.4 over the course of the 
project. 
 
 
Table 2: Overview of additional identified instruments in the case studies 
Economic instrument Application of the instrument in 
the context of the case study? 
Please describe 
Application of the instrument in the 
context of the case studies 
Risk-based EU solidarity 
fund 
Shifting from intergovernmental loss 
compensation  (the solidarity fund) 
to a risk-based mutual sovereign 
insurance fund 
EU/Eastern Europe/Romania  
Private financing linked 
to co-benefits 
‘Partnership funding' arrangements 
for financing flood defences that are 
being vigorously promoted in the 
UK. Private contributions to the 
costs of flood defences are being 
sought: (i) private actors may be 
major beneficiaries of risk reduction 
and (ii) because construction of 
flood defences can bring co-benefits, 
e.g. urban regeneration and 
provision or retail opportunities.  
UK case 
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4 Review of instruments: Market-based instruments 
The review of instruments takes into account a short presentation of the instrument, 
discusses how the instrument is linked to risk management, demonstrates general 
experience and evidence, possible case study application as well as specific conclusions. 
4.1 Subsidies 
Presentation of the economic instrument  
Subsidies can be defined as “direct payments, tax reductions, price supports or the 
equivalent thereof from a government to an entity for implementing a practice or performing 
a specified action” (Gupta et al., 2007). While subsidies have been criticised as an inefficient 
policy instrument that leads to rent seeking by interest groups and eventually reduces 
economic competitiveness through discouraging innovation and the adoption of adaptation 
measures if the risk is completely eliminated by the economic compensation (see Goodwin 
and Smith, 2013), public opinion and political decision makers have been more favourable to 
this instrument. Thus subsidies have retained an important place in the catalogue of public 
policy instruments. Subsidies could be used to induce any type of proactive adaptive 
investments and behavioural changes. The application is also thinkable for supporting 
reactive risk management such as post-disaster recovery or for managing systemic risks 
through e.g. insurances. In literature, subsidies are differentiated into direct payments and 
indirect payments, including price support (see Bräuninger et al., 2011). Common forms are 
direct payments in form of grants, tax reductions and price supports. Tax reductions could 
apply to direct personal taxes or to goods taxes.  
 
The link of subsidies to risk management 
In the following section we analyse whether subsidies can contribute to risk management 
and risk reduction.  Three types of risk reduction and management are distinguished as 
described above.  
 
Direct risk reduction (i.e. risk financing provides direct compensation payments which reduce 
follow-on risk) 
Besides the moral obligation for engagement after a disaster event, economic recovery and 
safety of the population guide public policies. Subsidies in the form of direct payments or tax 
reductions can be used for direct compensation payments. There is a concern however that 
this creates risk of moral hazard as it reduces the incentive for sustainable preventive 
measures or proper insurance coverage against disaster damage. Nevertheless, disaster 
relief, recovery and reconstruction subsidies are common responses to disasters on both 
local and national levels (see Lal et al., 2012). 
 
Indirect risk reduction through incentives for adaptation and increased resilience (e.g. 
adaption measures) 
Improvement of e.g. infrastructure that aims at protection of economic activities from 
extreme weather events - such as the raising of dyke levels - does often not generate direct 
revenues. Therefore, it can be considered as a public good that suffers from a lack of an 
incentive – an investor cannot capture all the benefits. In such a situation, government may 
provide a subsidy that is sufficient to mobilize the investment, taking into account any 
revenues that the investor might be able to generate. Hereby direct payments play a key 
role but also indirect support through tax reductions or floor prices can trigger such indirect 
risk reduction. Thus in terms of preventive adaptation incentives subsidies can play a key 
role. 
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To encourage risk reduction or adaptation activities, households could be allowed to deduct 
relevant expenditures like those for insulation of buildings or greening of taxable income. 
Firms could deduct more than actual adaptation expenditure from profits. Goods taxes could 
be reduced if production costs increase due to adaptation measures. An example might be a 
reduced VAT for agricultural goods which are more resistant to climate change than others. 
This reduces prices for these goods and thereby makes their production more attractive. This 
implies that the more resilient good is preferred (see Bräuninger et al., 2011).  
 
Managing systemic risk (up-and downside risks are managed at the same time) 
Subsidies can support the financing of insurance through direct financial contributions to the 
insurance rates or tax reductions for the stakeholders that apply insurance. 
Tax reductions can be applied to either the purchase of insurance and/or the income from 
insurance payments when they are realised, as in the case of the United States below. 
 
Experience and evidence 
Direct payments (grants) 
• Grants for preventive measures, Sweden: Municipalities may apply for grants for 
preventive measures against disasters which are not common or do not follow a slow 
incremental course.3 
• Farm Ready program, Australia: Australian government initiative to improve 
productivity and help farmers manage climate change and climate variability through 
soft adaptation measures.4 
• Funding program for private flood protection, Hamburg Port Authority, Germany: 
subsidizes protection infrastructures against floods and storm surges, mainly in 
industrial land uses not covered by the public flood protection system of the city of 
Hamburg.5 
 
Tax reductions 
Lunder et al. (2012) detail the tax provisions to assist with disaster recovery in Congressional 
legislation in the United States. The provisions all relate to the provision of tax reductions for 
victims, showing how the use of subsidies over negative taxes. Disaster victims are typically 
provided with a suite of tax reduction opportunities as they relate to disaster relief 
payments, insurance payments, casualty loss and capital gain from involuntary conversion of 
homes damaged by disaster.  
 
Application in the context of Enhance case studies 
Based on the feedback gathered in our questionnaire on economic instruments, we have 
been able to identify applied subsidies in the context of the Enhance case studies. The 
following list outlines current examples: 
 
 
                                        
3 Further information at: http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/574/a/96002 
4 Further information at: http://www.daff.gov.au/climatechange/australias-farming-
future/farmready 
5 Further information at:  http://www.fphws.de/foerderprogramm.htm 
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Flood risk management for critical infrastructure in the Port of Rotterdam, Netherlands: 
This case study develops guidance for hydro-metrological disaster risk management for 
un-embanked areas in the port of Rotterdam. Besides assessment of risks, the control 
and limitation of water related risks through enhanced flood resilience is a key objective. 
The guidance could be facilitated by the government through subsidies such as tax 
reductions for companies that engage in flood mitigation activities. 
 
Forest fire resilience in Chamusca, Portugal: 
The Portuguese case study in Chamusca will provide an analysis of the events of 2003, 
revisiting major drivers leading to catastrophic fires in Chamusca, and an assessment of 
the measures and policies to mitigate of impacts and risks of forest fires. Hereby the 
state incentivized forest owners to extract the burned cork from the trees after the 2003 
wildfires through grants. 
 
Health preparedness and heat wave response plans, trans-European: 
The objectives of this case study are to examine health sector plans that address 
preparedness and response to heat-waves, and to reach a consensus on the prioritisation 
of health interventions for heat-waves. Subsidies in form of grants can potentially 
facilitate adaptation retrofitting of buildings, particularly where vulnerable people are 
likely to reside. 
 
Testing the Solidarity Fund for Romania and Eastern Europe: 
An important instrument in Europe for providing additional capacity to governments 
following major disasters is the European Union Solidarity Fund. However the European 
Commission recognised the dangers of moral hazard if governments take on fewer 
preventive measures because they can rely on post-disaster support from the EU. 
Considering the introduction of pre-disaster risk management in the EUSF scheme also 
includes the assessment of suitable economic instruments. Thus subsidies or tax 
reductions for certain insurances might play an important role for providing alternatives 
to post-disaster payments. 
 
Conclusions 
Subsidies can appear in different forms, and are frequently employed instruments in policy 
generally. Our assessment has identified the following opportunities and challenges 
regarding the potential of subsidies to promote risk management. 
 
Opportunities comprise 
• DRM can be promoted via subsidies for recovery.  
• Subsidies have the potential to trigger important indirect risk management 
investments that would not happen otherwise. 
• Insurances that would otherwise not affordable can be subsidized thus promoting 
systemic risk management. 
Challenges amount to 
• Danger of moral hazard is given for all three levels of risk management subsidies. 
• Danger of maladaptation and misallocation of resources in case of inappropriate 
characteristics and level of subsidies. 
 
Regarding the attractiveness of subsidies for stakeholders in the context of a MSP, subsidies 
are a preferred option for the private sector including households. Given that the public 
sector usually finances subsidies its focus should be on public goods as otherwise such 
reallocation of tax money might not be acceptable under equity criteria.  
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In terms of suitable subsidy instruments, particularly direct payments (grants) and tax 
reductions seem to be appropriate in the context of proactive risk management and 
adaptation. The IPCC’s 5th assessment report also considers subsidies, besides taxes, as 
generally preferable instruments regarding efficiency (see Chambwera et al., 2014). Several 
existing examples have been identified and four Enhance case studies have applied or intend 
to apply subsidies as an economic instrument. Thus we recommend further exploring the 
suitability of grants and tax reductions in the context of multi-stakeholder partnerships. The 
drawbacks of publically financed private goods and moral hazards at all levels of risk 
management jeopardizing equity criteria will be particularly analyzed. 
 
4.2 Taxes and fees 
Presentation of the economic instrument  
Taxes are financial transfers by economic actors to the state without any direct service in 
return.  “General taxes are levied on a broad section of the public, such as wage earners or 
property owners. Selective sales taxes are levied on the sale of particular products and 
services. Fees or levies are charges for special municipal services, sometimes imposed only 
on the subset of the population benefiting from the service” (ICLEI, 2010).  
 
The main purpose of taxes is to create government revenues that are financing public 
expenditures. These public expenditures might also be a part of a public adaptation policy. 
This is clearly the case if these measures are public goods such as sea and river dikes.  
 
There are some markets where private behaviour does not lead to an optimal outcome. This 
is normally due to differences between the individual cost of consumption and the social 
cost. In this case taxes can be used to direct private behaviour towards a socially optimal 
behaviour. Then taxation has a double dividend: it improves market behaviour and leads to 
government revenue at the same time (see Bräuninger et al. 2011).  
 
One of the typical taxes or levies in the context of risk management are taxes on land and 
buildings. Usually they are linked to a service from the collecting (public) institution in return 
(Bräuninger et al., 2011). For example residents living in coastal areas prone to flood risks 
have been responsible for construction and maintenance of dykes in Northern Germany since 
the 15th century. Today local population is not involved in direct construction or maintenance 
activities but often contributes to its funding by levies on private property protected through 
dykes (see Mitchell and Myers, 2013). Besides these “land levies” other instruments such as 
carbon or energy taxes would have a relation to climate driven disasters in a broader sense. 
 
Typically taxes and fees are levied on carbon, energy and land use. Taxes and fees on 
carbon and energy have been widely applied, yet land use taxes – which are the ones 
immediately relevant to disaster risk management – are used sparingly. This may be due to 
the fact that their applicability is limited to landscapes such as agriculture and forest, and 
natural capital (biodiversity, ecosystems and water) (Bräuninger et al., 2011). However, 
since all countries in the European Union have a land or property tax system, these 
instruments remain an important site for investigation. 
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The link of taxes and fees to risk management 
In the following section we analyse whether taxes and fees can contribute to risk 
management and risk reduction.  It is distinguished between the three levels of risk 
reduction as described above.  
 
Direct risk reduction 
Collected taxes or levies can be used for emergency response, compensation or 
reconstruction activities ex-post the natural disaster. These fall into two broad categories: 
1. Land taxes applied to properties in a high-risk area to cover disaster risk 
management costs incurred by the local government. These taxes are based on 
the principle that property owners choosing to reside or conduct business in a 
high-risk area should be responsible for paying for the services of risk reduction, 
preparedness, emergency response and recovery incurred by the local 
government (Deyle and Smith, 2000). 
2. Catastrophe taxes, applied to the general population - for example within the 
income tax system - to spread and cover costs incurred by government in 
response to a major disaster (Kunreuther and Linnerooth-Bayer, 1999) 
Type 1 – land taxes in high risk areas, are frequently evoked as a potential instrument for 
raising revenue for disaster risk management, yet application remains scarce. This is possibly 
due to the difficulty in estimating the risk and associated costs, and political 
unattractiveness. Type 2 – catastrophe taxes, are seen as relatively more applicable, yet still 
politically difficult. This concept has been applied in Australia, when the Government 
introduced a temporary flood reconstruction levy following a major flooding event (see 
experience and evidence below). More commonly, the tax system is utilized in recovery to 
provide disaster victims with tax relief, see subsidies section above for discussion. 
 
Indirect risk reduction through incentives for adaptation and increased resilience 
Taxes or fees could be used for incentivizing population to move to resilient less risky living 
areas. Thus, constructions in areas with lower disaster risk levels would be imposed lower 
taxes. If the tax rate is set appropriately, only high value added activities would remain in 
the vulnerable area, reflecting individual optimization (Bräuninger et al., 2011) Higher tax 
revenues from areas with higher disaster likelihood could be used for financing risk reduction 
activities such as ecosystem restoration and the raising of dyke levels. The IPCC’s Special 
Report on Disaster Management states that “land use planning alone, may not be successful 
as a singular strategy but when coupled with related policies such as tax incentives or 
disincentives […] it could be effective (IPCC, 2012: 306). Bräuninger et al. (2011), among 
others, identify land use taxes as some of the most promising instruments available for 
adaptation, particularly in relation to dis-incentivizing development in high risk areas and soil 
sealing which leads to increased flood risk. A land tax could be applied to an area which is 
forecast to become increasingly vulnerable to disaster but where this risk is not being 
accounted for within the current market. Similar to their application to finance direct risk, 
application is scarce as they are rarely perceived as fair (Sterner, 2003). 
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Land taxes are not the only measure within this category available and in use for reducing 
risk and/or avoiding risk creation. The use of taxes and fees to protect biodiversity is 
important because of the role natural systems have in reducing risk, particularly in regards to 
flood. It may be argued that hunting and fishing fees can restrict habitat exploitation to a 
sustainable level. This is discussed further in section 4.4.1 on Payments to Ecosystem 
Services. 
 
Managing systemic risk  
Taxes and fees can form part of a comprehensive approach to risk management and may 
include provisions which incentivize uptake of insurance. Typically these schemes are set up 
as tax deductions for costs incurred in the purchase and/or utilization of insurance 
productions, these are discussed in the subsidies section above. 
 
Experience and evidence 
 
Taxes in the risk management context 
 
Levies and fees with regard to risk management: 
• Local flood defence levy, UK: The funding will be allocated to Lead Local Flood 
Authorities (LLFAs). LLFA's are established under the Flood and Water 
Management Act 2010. The levy finances grants to help councils to protect and 
support their own communities when managing flood risk. The funds have 
been/will be allocated based on the individual risk that each local authority has. 
Each local authority decides where the money will be of most use. 6  
• Temporary Flood Reconstruction Levy, Australia: A levy, at a rate of 0.5% on 
annual income exceeding A$50,000 (approx. €40,000) and 1% on income over 
A$100,000 has been introduced to fund a multi-billion-dollar rebuilding program 
after floods devastated infrastructure and ruined thousands of homes and 
businesses on the eastern coast in January 2011. Flood-stricken households are 
exempt.7 
 
Application in the context of ENHANCE case studies 
Based on the feedback gathered in our questionnaire on economic instruments we are able 
to identify applied taxes and fees in the context of the Enhance case studies. The following 
list outlines current examples: 
 
Climate variability & technological risk in the Po basin, Italy 
This case study will explore extreme weather and climate events (intense and deficient 
precipitation) along with ripple effects including key lifeline interruptions, industrial 
accidents, water crisis, and pollution. It will include proposals for improvements in 
emergency management, and possible insurance systems (see Surminski and Mysiak, 
2013). Hereby mandatory land use charges in connection with flood protection service 
could play a key role.  
 
 
 
                                        
6 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/25/contents  
7 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/tlafrlb2011613/memo_0.html 
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Flood risk management for critical infrastructure in the Port of Rotterdam, Netherlands 
It will be explored whether the Government could provide higher safety standards 
against fees. 
 
Forest fire resilience in Chamusca, Portugal 
A fuel tax might be applied in order to fund permanent forestry forest fire protection 
activities. 
 
Drought management in Jucar river basin district, Spain 
This case study explores the usefulness of economic instruments that so far have not 
been applied in the Jucar Basin District, private-public partnerships, and regulatory 
instruments to improve the resilience to droughts of water resources systems. It will be 
explored whether water tariffs, taxes or charges could enhance the quality and 
availability water resources.  
 
Conclusions 
Taxes, levies or fees are important instruments for creating state revenues and financing 
government spending all over the world. Thus they are a precondition for disaster risk 
reduction and risk management financed by the state and furthermore allow to indirectly 
incentivizing behaviour of population prone to potential disasters. Our assessment has 
identified the following opportunities and challenges regarding the potential to promote risk 
management. 
 
Opportunities comprise 
• For direct risk management taxes can be applied to finance recovery. Here we 
see a strong overlap with subsidies. 
• Taxes can be applied as a kind of “polluter pays principle” financing indirect risk 
management activities that benefit the tax payers. Further they dis-incentivize 
certain locations motivating resettlement.  
 
Challenges amount to 
• Political unattractiveness for implementing taxes on all three dimensions. 
• Danger of allocation of taxes as a public good to finance specific private goods. 
 
Regarding the attractiveness of taxes for stakeholders in the context of a MSP, they are 
usually not a preferred option for the private sector including households as they directly 
reduce the income level. From the point of view of the public sector, taxes can fulfil high 
equity standards when they are applied according to the “polluter’s pays principle”.  However 
policy makers often refrain from introducing new tax approaches as they are considered as 
politically unattractive.  
 
Due to their interesting potentials of addressing several dimensions of risk management 
while taking into account equity principles we recommend further exploring the suitability of 
taxes and fees in the context of multi-sector partnerships. A particular focus will be on land 
taxation. 
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4.3 Licences, permits and advanced market commitments 
Presentation of the economic instrument  
Markets, based on tradable units, are less commonly utilized for promoting risk reduction 
and adaptation. Since the 1990s, they have been increasingly applied in the environmental 
sector, particularly for internalising external costs of air pollutants. Most environmental 
markets are creating demand through regulated rights to use environmental goods. Typical 
examples are the trading of emission rights for SO2 and NOx in the United States since the 
early 1990s or the European CO2 Emission Trading System since 2008 (see also Burtraw and 
Szambelan, 2009). In a capped system the scarcity of units generates demand whereas open 
systems allow generation of offset units by reducing e.g. emissions below a baseline (see 
also Bräuninger et al., 2011).  Such markets have also been discussed generally in the 
context of promoting risk reduction or adaptation activities (e.g. see Butzengeiger-Geyer et 
al., 2011), however they cannot be used in practice as adaptation is a private good, for 
which there is a market already (such as using insurance instruments). Thus there is no 
rationale for policy intervention.  
 
The link of licenses, permits and advanced market commitments to risk management 
In the following section we analyse whether licenses, permits and variations can contribute 
to risk management and risk reduction.  We distinguish between the three levels of risk 
reduction as described above.  
 
Direct risk reduction  
We cannot identify any link between a market system based on licenses, permits or 
advanced market commitments and direct risk reduction through e.g. compensation 
payments. 
 
Indirect risk reduction 
A functional market with sufficient demand could theoretically trigger supply through risk 
reduction and adaptation activities. However as this instrument is discussed on a purely 
theoretical level, there is no evidence about effectiveness of such as scheme. 
 
Managing systemic risk 
In theory, there would be a link as risk is being traded; in practice, due to a lack of 
implementability, this link does not exist. 
 
Experience and evidence 
In practice, no system of licenses, permits or advanced market commitments has been 
introduced for risk reduction or adaptation. 
 
Application in the context of Enhance case studies 
Based on the feedback gathered in our questionnaire on economic instruments, we are able 
to identify advanced market commitments in the context of one ENHANCE case studies as 
follows: 
 
Forest fire resilience in Chamusca, Portugal 
It is envisaged that the government pays a premium for burned pine wood until 3 
months after the fire. During that time the quality and therefore economic value of the 
wood has significantly decreased. This advanced market commitment would be similar to 
a compensation subsidy for wood industry, forestry companies and forestry associations.  
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Conclusions 
Licenses, permits and advanced market commitments are common economic policy 
instruments, but not yet used for risk management or adaptation purposes. Only one case 
study considers advanced market commitments, which are similar to subsidies, we come to 
the conclusion that this EI is currently very limited in terms of applicability, yet, we will 
monitor it further in the Chamusca case study in terms of challenges and opportunities. 
 
Opportunities comprise 
• Licenses, permits and advanced market commitments have been used as policy 
instruments for other problems, such as climate change mitigation 
Challenges amount to 
• Licenses, permits and advanced market commitments have not been used in DRM a 
lot 
• Adaptation is a private good, whereas licences and permits aim at trading formerly 
public goods 
4.4 Other Market Based Instruments 
This EI category takes into account Payments for Ecosystem Services, water markets and 
water pricing. 
4.4.1 Payments for Ecosystem Services 
Presentation of the economic instrument 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) pay land owners or users to preserve the 
environmental health of the ecosystem. These payments are made because the ecosystem 
provides public and environmental health services which the society would like to maintain, 
but preserving them has a private cost to the land holder (Chambwera et al., 2014). In 
regards to risk management, healthy and thriving ecosystems provide important services, for 
example: upstream vegetation reduces downstream flood volume; coastal mangroves 
protect against storm surge; hillside vegetation helps prevent landslides; green infrastructure 
on roofs in cities reduces flooding and the urban heat island effect (UNISDR, 2011). 
 
There are three main types of PES schemes (UNECE, 2007): 
1. Public schemes where a government is the main ‘purchaser’ of the ecosystem service, 
typically via a land use or management practice adopted by the land user. 
2. Private schemes which are often local in scale and self-organized, where non-
government actors such as firms, NGOs, farmers’ associations or cooperatives, or private 
individuals purchase the ecosystem service. 
3. Trading schemes where markets are established to buy/sell/lease permits or quotas. 
 
UNECE (2007, p. 10) identifies six most common financial arrangements for the exchange of 
payments for ecosystem services: “(for sellers) direct compensation, investment or 
development  funds, and land purchasing and (for buyers) customer-charged payments, 
lump-sum contributions and tax-based contributions”. 
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Direct risk reduction  
We do not find a link. 
 
Indirect risk reduction 
Payments for Ecosystem Services can act as an indirect risk reduction incentive if they are 
applied to disaster provisioning services. For example, payments for flood protection by 
maintaining or restoring upstream forest ecosystems are a potential PES scheme which 
would reduce flood risk ex-ante (see Rusenski Lom, Bulgaria example below). 
 
Managing systemic risk 
We do not identify a link. 
 
Experience and evidence 
UNECE’s (2007) review of payments for environmental services in Europe does not identify 
any schemes relating specifically to disaster risk management. They identify several 
successful schemes which provide payments for the provision of clean water for drinking free 
from pesticides. The success of these schemes has led to the exploration of expansion of 
European PES schemes to consider flood protection services. In Rusenski Lom Nature Park, 
Bulgaria, there is a pilot PES scheme led by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) underway which 
includes valuations for flood protection (FAO 2013). 
 
Application in the context of ENHANCE case studies 
 
Forest fire resilience in Chamusca, Portugal 
After the big fires from 2003 and 2004 in the southern part of Portugal emerged a 
partnership between WWF and Coca-Cola to recover the local biodiversity on the natural 
park of Guadiana. A similar approach might also be applicable for the Chamusca case 
study region.  
 
Conclusions 
Cost-benefit analyses have shown that ensuring the health of ecosystem provide huge value 
for money for reducing risk. However ecosystem services remain difficult to value and this is 
identified as a main obstacle to the uptake of schemes which provide payments for 
ecosystem services (UNISDR, 2011). The limited scope of application is reducing 
effectiveness and transaction costs are potentially significant (Bräuninger et al., 2011). 
Despite this, the IPCC (Chambwera et al., 2014) identifies payments for ecosystem service 
schemes are a mechanism with much potential for incentivizing adaptation as experience 
and guidance on implementation grows. We will continue to marginally monitor the 
applicability for DRM of Payments for Ecosystem Services and identify key opportunities and 
challenges regarding the potential to promote risk management. 
 
Opportunities comprise 
• Linking up to ecosystem valuation and payments can provide massive co-benefits, 
and thus send strong signals for risk reduction 
Challenges amount to 
• Valuing ecosystem services 
• No experience with reference to disaster risk management  
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4.4.2 Water markets 
Presentation of the economic instrument  
Since prices in water do not reflect the economic value of water in its uses, allocation of 
scarce water across sectors is likely inefficient. In theory, the development of voluntary, 
mutually beneficial trades (water markets) can help to address inefficiencies in the current 
allocation of supplies by moving water to its highest-valued uses, providing an incentive for 
more efficient water use. The potential benefits from water trading have been discussed by 
economists for many decades (e.g. Mass and Anderson, 1978; Howe, 1986; Saliba and Bush, 
1987). Water markets can refer to the permanent exchange of water-use rights (water sales) 
or the short-term temporary exchange of a given quantity of water between users (or spot 
water markets). The majority of permanent transfers involve the purchase of agricultural 
water rights by the urban sector. In the case of option water markets, water transfers are 
contingent to certain drought conditions (water shortages) set in the contract. Water 
banking occurs when an intermediary (often a public organization, such as a river basin 
agency or a state agency) leases water from some users to lease it to other users. The 
selling prices include the administrative and technical costs of the bank. Finally, water 
markets can be either formal (with formal contracts within the legal framework, in some 
cases requiring public approval of the water transfer in order to avoid potential 
environmental and third party impacts) or informal markets (e.g. informal markets of 
groundwater among farmers in India and Pakistan). Water markets often requires 
government intervention to create the necessary conditions for markets to operate, including 
the definition of the original water rights allocation, the creation of the institutional and legal 
frameworks for trading, and the investments in the basic infrastructure to allow water 
transfers (Lund and Israel, 1995; Dinar et al., 1997).  
 
The link of water markets to risk management 
 
Direct risk reduction  
We did not find a link to direct risk reduction. 
 
Indirect risk reduction 
Water markets (WM) provide a flexible water allocation mechanism that allows to increase 
the economic efficiency in water allocation by securing water supply for high-value uses 
without the need to develop new costly water resources. WM contribute to reduce water 
supply risks and uncertainty, increasing water availability and reliability of supply under 
current and future conditions (Pulido-Velazquez et al., 2004), including adaptation to climate 
change (Loch et al., 2013). The additional flexibility provided by WM provides also a valuable 
tool for managing seasonal droughts (Charaklis et al., 1999).  
 
Water users are empowered by requiring their consent to water reallocations and 
compensation for any water transferred. WM provide security of water rights tenure if water 
rights are well-defined, so that water users can invest in water-saving technology knowing 
that they will benefit from the investment. WM also disseminates information about the real 
value of water, and induce water users to consider the opportunity cost of water, providing 
incentives to efficiently use water and to gain additional income through the sale of saved 
water. A market system would also provide incentives for water users to take into account 
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the external costs imposed of water use. While volumetric water pricing for irrigation would 
be seen by farmers as an expropriation of their traditional water rights, imposing income 
losses, the market-based approach is more acceptable to them (Dinar et al., 1997).  
 
But WM can also increase pressure on water resources, and mobilize unused rights. WM are 
prone to market failures, especially because of the presence of externalities, natural 
monopolies, and public goods competing with private demands. A system of tradable water 
rights can result in inefficient allocations due to different reasons like: poorly defined water 
rights, thinness of the market, market power and speculative behavior, uncertainty on water 
availability, the transaction costs and the external effects. All these aspects are affected by 
the type of water market, water rights and regulatory framework. WM can be subject to 
important transactions costs, which include the cost of the necessary infrastructure (for 
conveying, storing and perhaps treating the transferred water), the cost of identifying 
interested buyers and sellers, and the legal costs of creating and enforcing contracts and 
obtaining regulatory permission. Transaction costs can have a significant effect on the final 
price, with important implications in the character and number of the resulting water 
transfers (Carey et al., 2002). Finally, effective market allocation requires that third-party 
effects of water trading are identified and accurately quantified, and the associated costs are 
fully taken into account in the exchange process. Market failures can be corrected, or at least 
reduced, by introducing appropriate water right and incentives structures (Griffin and Hsu, 
1993; Spulber and Sabbaghi, 1994). 
 
Managing systemic risk 
There is no link to systemic risk management 
 
Experience and evidence 
Informal water markets are common (e.g. active groundwater markets in India and Pakistan; 
Diwakara, 2005, also in Mexico) and have been applied for decades (e.g. in Southeastern 
Spain; Mass and Anderson, 1978). However, despite the potential gains from trading, formal 
intersectoral water markets have been more slowly developed. The most important active 
formal water markets are in Australia, Chile, US (e.g. California, Colorado, Arizona, Texas), 
and South Africa, with significant differences regarding institutional configuration, regulatory 
framework and market properties (Bjornlund and McKay, 2002; Grafton et al., 2010).  
 
Application in the context of ENHANCE case studies 
 
Water markets in the Jucar river basin 
In ENHANCE, a hydroeconomic modelling approach (Pulido-Velazquez et al., 2008; 
Harou et al., 2009) will be applied to the analyse of the potential contribution of water 
markets to drought risk management in the Jucar case study (Spain). 
 
Conclusions 
Ideally water markets enhance economic efficiency by encouraging resources to move from 
lower to higher-valued uses. The introduction of water markets and water banks makes 
possible to balance supply and demand and to lessen the effects of severe droughts, 
reducing water supply risks and uncertainty. But water markets are also prone to market  
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failures, and government intervention and a proper regulatory framework (for determining 
prices, rules and liability) are needed in order to avoid undesirable outcomes. 
 
Our assessment has identified the following opportunities and challenges regarding the 
potential to promote risk management. 
 
Opportunities comprise 
• Water markets are in use and good evidence. 
• Water markets provide a flexible water allocation mechanism that allows to increase 
the economic efficiency and thus link to risk reduction (i.e. manage water supply in 
the face of droughts). 
Challenges amount to 
• Prone to market failures. 
• Large potential  for increased inequities. 
4.4.3 Water pricing 
Presentation of the economic instrument  
Better pricing is probably the most underutilized of all the tools available for solving water 
scarcity problems relative to its potential (Griffin 2006). Existing water prices typically are not 
related to the real water economic value and do not reflect resource scarcity. Water is often 
underpriced, and as a consequence, the quantity demanded frequently exceeds the supply, 
leading to a nonsustainable use of the resources. A proper water pricing policy has the 
potential to promote improved economic efficiency (Pulido-Velazquez et al., 2013). 
 
The real cost of water use has two elements: the cost of its provision and its opportunity 
cost. The key challenge for economic efficiency is to ensure that opportunity costs are 
considered in resource allocation decisions. By ignoring this resource opportunity cost, water 
is undervalued, what can lead to significant errors in investments and water allocation 
among users. Users should get a signal of water’s opportunity costs so that they behave 
accordingly. When the price of water reflects its marginal cost (marginal cost pricing), the 
resource will be put to its highest-valued uses and theoretically an optimal resource 
allocation would be reached, for which the marginal productivity of water would be equal 
across the different uses and over time and society’s economic welfare would be maximized.  
 
Despite the apparent simplicity of the concept, measuring the opportunity costs of scarce 
water is difficult. Since water markets are usually absent or inefficient, scarcity values 
frequently go unrecognized, and the assessment of these opportunity costs requires a 
systems approach and a proper method to estimate the value of water for the different users 
in the system to develop shadow prices reflecting the value of water (Pulido-Velazquez et al. 
2008). 
 
Direct risk reduction  
Water pricing has an essential role in water management: a financial role (for cost recovery 
of investments, but also the possibility of using the additional funding from pricing to further 
secure future water supply). 
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Indirect risk reduction 
Water pricing acts as an economic instrument for incentivizing a more efficient water use. 
While water pricing is ubiquitious, the use of water pricing as an economic instrument has 
only been explored  rarely for disaster risk management and climate adaptation, thus we 
have not identified experience and evidence or the application in an ENHANCE case study. 
 
Managing systemic risk 
There is no link to systemic risk management. 
 
Application in the context of ENHANCE case studies 
 
Water pricing in the Jucar river basin 
The Jucar case study (Spain) will also study waterpricing as an instrument. 
 
Opportunities comprise 
• Water pricing with good evidence – apart from DRM. 
• Water pricing has an essential role in water management 
 
Challenges amount to 
• Pricing issues as measuring the opportunity costs of scarce water is difficult. 
 
4.5 Risk financing instruments 
There are many instruments for dealing with the financial burden imposed by disasters. At 
the most general level, we distinguish risk financing from loss financing instruments. The 
important distinction is that risk financing is purchased/organized by persons or a community 
at risk purposefully and in anticipation of risk, whereas loss financing is arranged by people, 
governments and the state, often ad hoc, after an event. Risk transfer through key tools 
such as insurance shares risks before a catastrophe occurs and requires the use of 
predisaster (ex ante) arrangements in which the risk cedent incurs a cost in return for the 
right to receive a potentially much larger amount of money after a disaster occurs.   
 
Insurance and other RFI do not automatically and explicitly lead to physical risk reduction, 
meaning that the risk is mainly redistributed instead of being reduced. But, if these 
instruments are well designed then they can promote the reduction of risks, aid in the 
recovery process by compensating losses that may be too large for households and 
businesses to bear individually thus reducing indirect disaster losses, as well as to create an 
environment for exploiting opportunities. In the following, we will not further discuss loss 
financing instruments in isolation, as they are reactive and thus do not help to incentivize or 
share risks in a planned and systematic manner. However, we will discuss some of those in 
combination with RFI. In the remainder and in general , we distinguish private sector 
insurance, property insurance (including household contents), agricultural insurance for 
crops and business insurance, and sovereign insurance incl. intergovernmental risk pooling 
 
Presentation of the economic instrument  
Insurance risk transfer has been used for centuries as a tool to manage the risk of uncertain 
losses (Freeman and Kunreuther, 2003). In simplified terms, insurance acts as a mechanism 
to transfer risks or part of a risk from the insured to the insurer, with a return to the insurer  
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in the form of a premium payment. This transaction reduces the uncertainty associated with 
risk and is a vital mechanism that drives economic systems. Without insurance, those 
activities and processes that would often be labelled as too risky would not be commenced 
and those affected by a loss may experience difficulty in recovery (Surminski and Oramas-
Dorta, 2013). The insurance company can play this risk spreading role because risk averse 
insured are typically willing to pay insurance premiums that are higher than the expected 
value of the covered loss (the risk) (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2009). 
 
The main role of insurance is the transfer of risks and the provision of compensation in the 
event of a loss. As an economic tool it can take many various forms: It may be provided by 
public or private entities or by both cooperating in a public-private partnership, be 
compulsory or voluntary, cover a range of different insureds and hazards, and the cover 
provided may be loss based (a loss must be evident) or parametric (triggered by a certain 
event). Exploring this in more detail the range of those who can be insured varies in both 
size and type, with individuals, businesses, insurers/reinsurers (via reinsurance), 
organisations or governments all holding cover. Also the type of hazard and exposure that 
insurance can cover may vary, for example, floods and illness (hazard), to homes, motor 
cars or business interruption (exposure) each maintaining varying levels of coverage design 
(such as deductibles, exclusions and conditions).  
 
Within many developed countries insurance is common and widely used tool, although 
availability, demand and scope vary significantly from country to country owing to local 
customs and traditions, different levels of risk and risk attitudes and regulation of insurance 
markets (e.g. Schwarze and Wagner, 2007; Paudel et al., 2012). Poor households in 
transition and developing countries commonly lack access to insurance markets so that most 
damage caused by natural hazards is not carried by the insurance sector (Hoff et al. 2005). 
A key factor is affordability. In addition, limited availability of loss data, a lack of an 
insurance culture, and poor contract enforcement are other factors that impede the 
development of natural disaster insurance. Nevertheless, innovative insurance schemes such 
as micro insurance and index based insurance could expand insurance coverage against 
natural disasters, 
 
Direct risk reduction  
The main function of insurance is to reduce risks  in terms of alleviating the financial risks 
associated with disaster losses: claim payments received quickly and sufficiently post-event 
will reduce the overall burden from a disaster. There is ample evidence that this is the case 
and works fine (see Chambwera et al., 2014). 
 
Indirect risk reduction  
Insurance can act as a tool towards averting risk, with the insurance industry being 
exemplified as a ‘bridge between public and private sectors in addressing risk awareness, 
physical resilience and financial preparedness’ (WEF, 2011). The theoretical potential for 
insurance to reduce risk is well versed in literature and there are several ways in which it 
may be considered for such a role. Crichton (2008), for example, suggests how insurance 
may lead to physical risk reduction specifically for flooding with several key areas 
acknowledged as leading to risk reduction; identifying areas at risk, catastrophe modelling, 
economic incentives to prevent development in the floodplain, data on the cost of flood 
schemes for flood risk management appraisal, resilient reinstatement after a flood event and 
support for temporary defence solutions (Crichton, 2008). Paudel et al. (2012) continue this 
with a clear distinction between ‘risk assessment and mapping’, ‘policies and regulations 
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integrated into the insurance system’ and ‘(financial) incentives that insurance provides to 
policyholders to invest in mitigation’ (Paudel et al., 2012).  
 
Because insurance instruments (and other RFIs) require detailed analysis of risks, they can 
both raise awareness and provide valuable information necessary for responding to and 
reducing risk. In some countries, insurers with other partners have made flood and other 
hazard maps publicly available. Insurers can inform their clients directly about the levels of 
risks they are facing. Insurers can also present their clients with information on the available 
risk prevention measures. By pricing risk, insurance can provide incentives for its reduction. 
If natural disaster risks are factored into the premium calculation, it should theoretically 
provide incentives for the clients to reduce these risks. For this to be effective, the pricing 
has to reflect changes in the risk levels when risk prevention measures have been 
implemented. For example, policyholders who invest in measures that limit natural disaster 
damage (e.g. by flood proofing homes) should be rewarded by insurance premium discounts 
(Kunreuther, 1996).  
 
Insurers and other providers can require risk reduction as a contractual condition. For 
example, insurers have required commercial goods to be stored at a specified height to avoid 
water damage as a condition for insuring a business. 
 
Insurance could provide a broader insurance coverage if natural disaster risk are reduced. 
For example, in France deductibles can be increased for policyholders who live in 
communities that face repeated flooding and do not have adequate risk mitigation plans 
which include damage mitigation measures in place, while deductibles are lowered if such 
plans and risk reducing measures are taken (Poussin et al., 2013).  
 
Providers of insurance can serve as lobbyists or partners with government and communities 
to promote land use planning, emergency response and other types of risk-reducing 
behaviour. In many countries, for example, insurers have co-financed research institutes and 
disaster management centres, and in other cases, have partnered with government to 
achieve changes in the planning system and more investment in public protection measures.  
 
On the other hand, insurance can lead to moral hazard, which describes the disincentive for 
risk prevention provided by the perception of financial security when purchasing insurance 
cover. This is more the rule rather than the exception (see Chambwera et al., 2014) and will 
be discussed further below. 
 
Managing systemic risk 
Insurance (and other RFIs) allow households and businesses to plan with more certainty, 
and by providing a safety net they facilitate cost-effective, yet risky, investments. Index-
based  or parametric insurance, where products are written against physical or economic 
triggers  against events that cause loss, not against the loss itself, hold high appeal  
(traditional insurance is indemnity based, where products are written against actual losses). 
While little implementation and analysis has been done in Europe, this new generation of 
insurance products is being offered in developing countries based on parametric mechanisms 
 
A recent example in Malawi shows that insurance can also have benefits even in the absence 
of a disaster.  Because of drought risk, groundnut farmers in this country have historically 
experienced extreme difficulty in receiving loans that enable them to purchase more 
productive seed and other agricultural inputs. A pilot program initiated in 2005 provided the 
safety net necessary for farmers to plant higher-risk seeds that increased their productivity 
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(in this case) five-fold (Hess and Syroka 2005). Overall, for the context of developing 
countries, analysis conducted by Surminski and Oramas-Dorta (2013) identifies that different 
levels of direct links between risk transfer and risk reduction exist:  
 
• risk awareness-raising initiatives, such as the provision  of risk-relevant information 
and knowledge transfer to educate policy-holders and the public about preventive 
measures; 
• capacity-building through knowledge transfer and educational elements;  
• explicit incentive structures for risk reduction, such as risk based pricing, where 
premiums reflect risk such as charging according to local flood risk levels;  
• compulsory risk reduction, such as requiring policy holders to take certain preventive 
measures as a condition for cover.  
 
The IPCC’s report on managing the risk of extreme events (IPCC, 2012) also supports the 
overall idea that ‘risk sharing (formal insurance, micro-insurance, crop insurance) can be a 
tool for risk reduction and recovering livelihoods’ in the case of extreme weather events, yet 
also states that disincentives exist, particularly if the scheme is not correctly structured. 
 
What is the potential of insurance to lead to improved risk management? There are many 
risk management options in different sectors that the different private and public  insurance 
arrangements may incentivize (see also table below for key options), such as (see table 3). 
• Flood proofing of buildings and property, 
• Retrofitting of houses (e.g. against windstorm), 
• Local flood protection measures, 
• Flood proofing infrastructure, 
• Building larger scale flood protection schemes, 
• Switching to more heat and drought resistance cultivars, 
• Implementation of  more efficient irrigation measures. 
 
 
Table 3: Insurance and adaptation according to key sectors 
Policy sector 
as per White 
Paper 
Sectoral 
uptake 
Type of insurance Incentivized private adaptation 
Private 
property 
+++ Property insurance: private 
properties are insured against 
flood and windstorm risks 
Risk (flood and windstorm)- based 
pricing and deductibles can 
incentivize the following efforts 
Flood proofing of buildings and 
property (raising plinth, adapting 
cellars etc.) 
Retrofitting of houses (e.g. against 
windstorm) 
Production 
Systems 
and services 
+++ Property business insurance: 
Insurance and other RFI are well 
used by industry to cope with the 
financial consequences of 
disasters, e.g. against flood and 
windstorm risks. 
Larger businesses often self-
insure by pooling risks across 
their different operations in 
different locations or countries 
Risk (flood and windstorm)- based 
pricing and deductibles can 
incentivize the following efforts 
 
Flood proofing of buildings and 
property 
Retrofitting of houses (e.g. against 
windstorm) 
Resilience of supply chains, factories 
and their inventory etc. 
 Local flood protection measures with 
private good characteristic 
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Physical 
infrastructur
e (private 
and public) 
++ Sovereign insurance and regional 
pools for flood and windstorm risk 
Insurance can be used for 
infrastructure, but in many 
developed countries the public 
sector self-insures via its taxing 
function 
Sovereign insurance  contracts via 
risk based pricing and deductibles can 
incentivize 
• Flood- proofing infrastructure 
• Retrofitting buildings 
• Building larger scale flood 
protection schemes 
Health and 
social 
policies 
- Less relevant. However some 
risks such as heat stress and  
disease may be covered by life, 
health or employers’ insurance, 
which are very different from 
catastrophe insurance 
- 
Agriculture 
& forests 
+++ Agricultural insurance for drought 
and heatwave risks. Very relevant 
for crop insurance, less so for 
forestry, as most forests are self-
insured, often implicitly 
Risk (drought and heatwave)- based 
pricing and deductibles can 
incentivize the following efforts 
• Switching to more heat and 
drought resistance cultivars 
• Developing crop variants with 
longer growing cycles 
• Implementation of 
(additional) irrigation measures 
Biodiversity, 
ecosystems, 
water 
-  These “non-tangibles” are less 
insurable, so applicability is very 
limited 
- 
Coastal and 
maritime 
areas 
+++ Property insurance: private and 
business. 
Generally RFI can be and are 
used, if the underlying hazard is 
extreme such as storm surge, but 
less so for ‘inevitable’ risks such 
as sea level rise and coastal 
erosion. Physical assets located at 
sea can be handled by RFI’s. 
• Flood proofing of buildings and 
property 
• Retrofitting of houses (e.g. against 
windstorm) 
• Local flood protection measures 
 
Source: Bräuninger et al., 2011 
 
Experience and evidence 
In theory, the potential of insurance to work in favour of risk reduction is agreed amongst 
most observers. However, the evidence of the implementation and effectiveness of such 
measures is extremely limited. Academic debate has focused primarily on developed 
countries and property insurance, mostly in the context of flood (Michel- Kerjan and 
Kunreuther, 2011; Crichton, 2008, Surminski et.al. 2013).  
 
In the UK, a recent proposal for a new flood insurance scheme (Flood Re) has been 
released, principally due to rising risk levels and despite existing reduction efforts (ABI, 
2013). The current scheme in place, the Statement of Principles (SoP), specifically addresses 
several key aspects that can lead to risk reduction; a need for better flood risk information, 
stricter planning policy and more investment in flood defences. Compounded by the need for 
affordability and availability of flood insurance to households the proposed new scheme, 
Flood Re, creates a pool for high risk properties, funded by all policy holders. It is seen as a 
transition towards risk reflecting pricing in the future, but so far the proposals do not contain 
any elements of incentivizing risk reduction (Surminski et.al 2013). 
 
In Austria, the ‘Hora’ risk mapping initiated and driven by insurers for public awareness 
should in theory lead to risk reduction by policyholders but the resulting physical risk 
reduction efforts are scarce (Surminski, 2010).  As these examples show, measuring success, 
implementation and effectiveness of these remains a challenge and there appear to be a 
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number of barriers and trade-offs limiting the potential of insurance to act for risk reduction. 
Bräuninger et al. (2011) discuss the barriers for incentivising risk reduction for three main 
insurance based approaches; risk pricing, reducing vulnerability and provision of risk 
information; 
 
Picard (2008) highlights the trade-off between the effectiveness of risk based pricing and 
equity – as those most vulnerable could possibly not be able to pay for risk-based premiums.  
Other studies have explored the link between premium pricing and risk reduction through 
methods such as interviews with the insured, hypothetical modeling and willingness to pay 
exercises. In Germany, Thieken et al. (2006) found that insured householders are more likely 
to undertake risk reduction measures over that of the uninsured- implying that flood 
insurance sets a precedent for action from policyholders. In the Netherlands, evidence 
presented by Botzen et al. (2009) suggests that homeowners would be prepared to invest in 
flood risk reduction measures if this led to an insurance premium reduction.  In fact two-
thirds were found to be willing to invest in water barriers, a quarter to move central heating 
apparatus to a safer location and a fifth to instate water resistant flooring.  
 
Although we know little about how this risk reduction may actually contribute to risk 
reduction in established insurance markets, we know even less in about it in the context of 
developing markets as again evidence remains extremely limited. The suitability of insurance 
related instruments for disaster risk reduction in vulnerable countries was investigated by 
Suarez and Linnerooth-Bayer (2011). The study concludes that these tools can effectively 
spread losses both spatially and temporally but also to other parties, resulting in a reduced 
vulnerability and enhancing preparedness. However several obstacles are also present 
requiring support from international development communities- this is important if such 
programs are to progress. The potential links between risk financing (including insurance) 
and risk reduction are also summarised with a wide range of studies presented that 
exemplify where insurance can influence behavior and physical risk reduction. This can be in 
a moral hazard context (insurance leads to risky behavior), where insurance prompts risk 
reduction measures or through preventative measures and improved building standards 
(Suarez and Linnerooth-Bayer, 2011).  
 
Application in the context of ENHANCE case studies 
In ENHANCE, several case studies explore the current provision of natural disaster insurance 
and the role that public and private partnerships play in transferring climate risks:   
• Multi-hazard risk assessment in Po river basin basins (Italy) 
• Flood risk and climate change implications for Multi Sector Partnerships (United 
Kingdom) 
• Insurance and forest fire resilience in Chamusca (Portugal) 
• Flood risk management for Critical infrastructure (The Netherlands) 
• Testing the Solidarity Fund for Romania and Eastern Europe 
 
Conclusions 
In summary, we note a gap of exploring how risk reduction and risk transfer can work hand-
in hand – this applies to developed markets and to those where there is little history of 
insurance. The key message that emerges from this dialogue is that the design, form and 
implementation of a risk transfer scheme will determine the promotion and effectiveness of 
risk reduction and the level of moral hazard. 
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Key opportunities and challenges are: 
 
Opportunities 
• Insurance reduces the cost of risk bearing, and  is attractive to insured and insurers. 
• Insurance in theory promotes risk reduction, thus is attractive to insured and insurers 
alike. 
• Insurance can help to manage systemic risks, so link up with socio-economic 
31development. 
 
Challenges 
• Insurance payouts have been useful, yet, often purely private-based insurance would 
be expensive, and generally there is need for direct or cross-subsidization. 
• Insurance has often provided for moral hazard, and the link to indirect risk reduction 
is weak. 
• The systemic function is bets provided for index-based insurance, which has not 
really been applied in Europe so far. 
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5 Overall findings and conclusions 
Table 4 summarizes part of our review in terms of the theoretical link of EI to risk 
management, the identified evidence as well as the anticipated assessment and 
consideration in the case studies. We identified that all three dimensions of risk reduction are 
covered by some of the instruments and case studies. Indirect risk reduction is 
predominantly used and there is wide experience and evidence of suitable instruments. 
Direct risk reduction and systemic risk management instruments are rather innovative and 
experience is limited. but for the RFI. The table shows which case studies are interested in 
applying EI for the three dimensions of risk reduction. 
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Table 4: Identified instruments with their links to the three dimensions of risk reduction 
Instrument/Channel Direct risk reduction Indirect risk reduction Systemic risk 
Subsidies Funding for relief 
and reconstruction 
Some evidence 
Subsidize risk reduction measures; 
moral hazard 
Good evidence 
(S, D, AUS, Asia, Chamusca) 
Subsidize 
insurance 
premiums, 
good evidence 
(EUSF) 
Taxes and fees Raise funding for 
relief and 
reconstruction 
Some evidence 
Internalization of cost leads to 
efficiency gains 
• UK (Flood defence levy) 
• Po (mandatory land use charge) 
• Chamusca (Fuel tax for funding 
permanent forestry funds for fire 
protection activities) 
• Jucar (water taxes) 
 
Licences, permits 
and advanced 
market 
commitments 
 
 Trading rights and liabilities 
 
Advanced market commitment: 
government pays a premium for 
burned pine wood until 3 months 
after the fire (Chamusca) 
 
Payment for 
Ecosystem 
services 
 Integrate payment for DRM with PES; 
Emerging in climate adaptation 
• Po (water banking in agriculture 
to urban users) 
• Jucar (Water markets) 
• Chamusca (Payment for 
Ecosystem Services by 
WWF/Coca Cola) 
 
 
Water markets  Leads to efficiency increase in water 
use, good evidence , 
• Jucar 
 
Risk financing Provides claim 
payments post-
disaster helping to 
reduce economic 
risk, Good evidence 
(EUSF) 
Moral hazard, good evidence 
• Po (mandatory insurance, 
subsidized) 
• Jucar (crop insurance) 
• Chamusca (wildfire forest 
insurance) 
• EU SDF (compensation , risk 
reduction and risk financing) 
Index-based 
insurance 
manages up 
and down-
side risk, 
limited 
evidence 
Chamusca 
Note: Font shading indicates the following: black-theoretical link, red-level of evidence, blue-case 
study application  
 
Our assessment of the EI categories according to the criteria “link to risk management”, 
“attractiveness for typical MSP stakeholders”, “experience and evidence” as well as 
“application in Enhance case studies” shows which EI will be more or less interesting for 
further assessment in the context of the ENHANCE project. E.g. the categories “licenses and 
permits” as well as “financial instruments” have been discarded for further analysis. The 
other categories revealed suitable EI as demonstrated in table 5 that will be further 
evaluated in the context of our case studies. Thus work step 5.2 takes into account EI such 
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as grants, tax reductions, land use taxes and fees, payments for ecosystem services, water 
markets and water pricing as well as the various risk financing instruments. 
 
 
Table 5: Assessment of economic instruments for risk management and adaptation 
 
  
 Assessment 
criteria 
Subsidies Taxes Licenses, 
permits, 
market 
commitmen
ts 
Other Market 
Based 
Instruments 
RFIs 
Link to risk 
management 
(direct; indirect or 
systemic risk 
management)  
Strong link Medium link Medium link Medium link Strong link 
Attractiveness for 
typical MSP 
stakeholders (public 
(pu) / private (pr) / 
households (h) 
High for pr & h 
Low for pu 
Low for pr & h 
Medium for pu 
Low to high 
for all 
High  
PES for pu, 
water pricing 
and markets for 
pr/h 
High (for sov. 
insurance and 
solidarity fund only 
pu and pr) 
Experience and 
evidence 
High 
 
Medium n.a. Low 
 
High 
Application in 
Enhance case 
studies 
High 
 
Low n.a. Medium High 
Focus of further 
assessment 
Grants, tax 
reductions 
Land use 
taxes & fees 
Market 
commitmen
ts 
PES, Water 
pricing/marke
ts 
Property 
insurance, crop 
and forest fire 
insurance, sov. 
insurance,  risk-
based solidarity 
fund 
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